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Abstract
The established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental exter-
nalities has it that, since firms neglect the external eﬀect, their incentive
to invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to
some form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to this
issue, using a simple diﬀerential game to show that the conclusion reached
by the static literature is not robust, as the introduction of dynamics shows
that firms do invest in R&D for environmental-friendly technologies through-
out the game. Moreover, our setup also illustrates the existence of multiple
equilibria, only one of which is identified by the corresponding static game.
Keywords: pollution, environmental externality, R&D, optimal control,
diﬀerential games
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1 Introduction
The control of polluting emissions damaging the environment is a hot issue
and is receiving an increasing amount of attention in the current literature
in the field of environmental economics. Most of the existing contributions
investigate the design of optimal Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing firms
to reduce damaging emissions, both in monopoly and oligopoly settings.1 A
related stream of literature examines the incentive for firms to carry out R&D
activities in order to introduce environmental-friendly technologies. This re-
quires the introduction of some form of taxation/subsidy by the policy maker,
in order to induce firms to take into account the presence of the externality,
that they would clearly neglect otherwise.2 A third line of research investi-
gates the optimal design of minimum quality standards and/or profit taxation
in vertically diﬀerentiated industries aﬀected by environmental externalities.3
In the present paper, we take a diﬀerential game approach to the in-
vestigation of environmentally-oriented R&D eﬀorts in a dynamic Cournot
oligopoly model where there is no tax or subsidy linked to the external ef-
fect, in order to show that the main message emerging from the corresponding
static version of the same game falls short of telling the whole story of the
issue at hand. In particular, we describe a scenario where the stock of pol-
lution increases in proportion to industry output, and each firm may invest
in R&D in order to diminish its individual contribution to the emission of
pollutants.
We show that the game yields multiple steady state equilibria, one of
which corresponding to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The striking
1See Bergstrom et al. (1987), Karp and Livernois (1994), Bovenberg and de Mooij
(1997) and Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002), inter alia.
2To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania
(1996) and Poyago-Theotoky (2007), inter alia.
3See Lutz et al. (2000) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), inter alia.
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diﬀerence between the static analysis and ours is that we prove that the R&D
eﬀorts of firms is indeed positive at any time during the game, along all of
the optimal trajectories leading to any of the three steady states. The static
game captures the main feature of one of the steady states we identify, but
cannot grasp the essence of what happens along the optimal path to this long
run equilibrium. In the remaining two cases, the R&D eﬀort is positive even
in correspondence of the steady state point.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly
outlines the static version of the game. The setup of the dynamic problem
is laid out in section 3. The diﬀerential game is then illustrated in section 4.
In section 5 we compare the profit and welfare performance of the industry
in correspondence of the multiple steady state equilibria. Some concluding
remarks are in section 6.
2 A summary of the static problem
As a preliminary step, we revisit the static Cournot game in order to high-
light the lack of R&D incentives to decrease the amount of polluting emis-
sions characterising firms. The market is supplied by N single-product
homogeneous-good firms. The market demand function is p = a − Q, with
Q =
PN
i=1 qi, qi being firm i’s output. Technology is the same for all firms
alike, and it is summarised by the cost function C = cqi. Supplying the fi-
nal good entails a negative environmental externality S =
PN
i=1 biqi, where
bi = b−ki ≥ 0; b measures the marginal contribution of each firm to the stock
of pollutants; ki is the R&D eﬀort of firm i to decrease its individual amount
of pollution,4 and it involves a convex cost Γi = rk2i , r > 0. Consequently,
4Here we assume firm-specific externalities and R&D activities, as it appears to be
reasonable in examining investments in environmental-friendly technologies. Hence, we
rule out the possibility of spillovers in R&D.
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firm i’s instantaneous profits are πi = (p− c) qi − Γi. The present game has
a two-stage structure: in the first stage, firms non-cooperatively and simul-
taneously set their respective R&D eﬀorts; in the second, they compete a`
la Cournot-Nash. The solution concept is subgame perfection by backward
induction.
The optimal individual output in the second stage is q∗ = (a− c) / (N + 1) ,
whereby the profit function at the first stage reads πi = [(a− c) / (N + 1)]2−
rk2i . This clearly entails that ∂πi/∂ki < 0, and therefore the optimal R&D
investment is nil. On this basis, one has to introduce some form of envi-
ronmental taxation, no matter whether it is firm-specific or not, to induce
firms to take into account the presence of the externality and indeed carry
out some R&D eﬀorts to reduce it. As we shall see in the following sections,
this is not necessarily the case if one adopts a properly dynamic approach to
this issue.
3 The dynamic setup
As in the static model, consider a Cournot oligopoly with N single-product
homogeneous-good firms interacting over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) . At any
time t, the demand function is p (t) = a−Q (t) , withQ (t) =
PN
i=1 qi (t) , qi (t)
being the instantaneous individual output of firm i. All firms use the same
productive technology, described by the cost function C (t) = cqi (t) . The
production of the final output involves a negative environmental externality
S (t) , evolving according to the following dynamics:
·
S (t) =
NX
i=1
bi (t) qi (t)− δS (t) , (1)
where δ > 0 is a constant decay rate the initial condition being S (0) = S0.
The coeﬃcients bi (t) also evolve over time, driven by the nonnegative R&D
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eﬀort ki (t) of each firm i, whereby
·
bi (t) = bi (t) [η − ki (t)] , η > 0. (2)
That is, until ki keeps smaller than the threshold value η, bi is increasing. The
instantaneous cost associated with R&D activity is Γi (t) = rk2i (t) , with r >
0. Hence, firm i’s instantaneous profits are πi (t) = [p (t)− c] qi (t) − Γi (t) ,
and firm i has to set qi (t) and ki (t) so as to maximise
Πi =
Z ∞
0
{[p (t)− c] qi (t)− Γi (t)} e−ρtdt, (3)
under the set of constraints given by the state equations (1) and (2). Param-
eter ρ > 0 is a constant discount rate common to all firms.
4 The game
The solution concept is the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The Hamiltonian
of firm i is:
Hi (·) = e−ρt
(
[p (t)− c] qi (t)− Γi (t) + λi
·
S (t) + µii
·
bi (t) +
X
j 6=i
µij
·
bj (t)
)
,
(4)
with the following necessary conditions (FOCs):
∂Hi
∂qi
= a− c− 2qi (t)−Q−i (t) + λi (t) bi (t) = 0 (5)
where Q−i (t) =
P
j 6=i qj (t) ;
∂Hi
∂ki
= −2rki (t)− µii (t) bi (t) = 0, (6)
whereas the adjoint equations read as follows:
·
λi (t) = (ρ+ δ)λi (t) (7)
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·
µii (t) = [ρ− η + ki (t)]µii (t)− λi (t) qi (t) (8)
·
µij (t) = [ρ− η + kj (t)]µij (t)− λi (t) qj (t) . (9)
From (5) and (6) one obtains, respectively:
λi (t) = −
a− c− 2qi (t)−Q−i (t)
bi (t)
(10)
µii (t) = −
2rki (t)
bi (t)
(11)
while the value of any µij (t) is irrelevant due to additive separability.
Now one can impose symmetry across quantities, costate variables and
states:
qi (t) = qj (t) = q (t) , λi (t) = λj (t) = λ (t) ,
µii (t) = µjj (t) = µ (t) , bi (t) = bj (t) = b (t)
and drop the time argument for brevity. From the FOCs (5) and (6) one also
obtains the control equations:
·
q =
λ
·
b+
·
λb
N + 1
,
·
k = −µ
·
b+
·
µb
2r
(12)
which can be rewritten, using (7-8) and (10-11), leading to the following
state-control dynamical system:
·
S (t) = b (t) q (t)− δS (t) (13)
·
b(t) = b(t)(η − k(t)) (14)
·
q(t) =
[(N + 1) q(t)− a+ c] (ρ+ δ + η − k(t))
N + 1
(15)
·
k(t) = ρk(t)− q(t) [a− c− (N + 1) q(t)]
2r
(16)
Lemma 1 The stationary points of the system are:
PA =
µ
SA = 0, bA = 0, qA =
a− c
N + 1
, k∗ = 0
¶
,
5
PB = (SB = 0, bB = 0, qB, kB) ,
PC = (SC = 0, bC = 0, qC , kC) ,
where
qB =
a− c−
q
(a− c)2 − 8r (N + 1) (ρ+ δ + η) ρ
2 (N + 1)
qC =
a− c+
q
(a− c)2 − 8r (N + 1) (ρ+ δ + η) ρ
2 (N + 1)
kB = kC = δ + ρ+ η.
Proof. Imposing the stationarity condition
·
k = 0 yields
k (q) =
q [a− c− (N + 1) q]
2rρ
(17)
which can be plugged into
·
q = 0 to obtain the following solutions:
qA =
a− c
N + 1
; qB,C =
a− c±
q
(a− c)2 − 8r (N + 1) (ρ+ δ + η) ρ
2 (N + 1)
(18)
with qB,C ∈ R+ for a − c >
p
8r (N + 1) (ρ+ δ + η) ρ. By substituting in
(17) we have that kB,C = δ + ρ+ η.
In correspondence of the classical Cournot-Nash optimal quantity q1, we
have k1 = 0. Equations (13-14) only admit the fixed points S = 0, b = 0.
Lemma 2 PA, PB and PC are saddle points of the system.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix of the state-control system reads as:
J =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−δ Nq Nb 0
0 η − k 0 −b
0 0 ρ+ δ + η − k −q + a− c
N + 1
0 0
1
2r
[2(N + 1)q − a+ c] ρ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
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J(PA) has the eigenvalues λ1 = −δ < 0, λ2 = η > 0, λ3 = ρ+ δ + η > 0 and
λ4 = ρ > 0, subsequently PA is a saddle point.
The analysis of the remaining two equilibria is slightly more diﬃcult:
both J(PB) and J(PC) admit the negative eigenvalues λ1 = −δ < 0 and
λ2 = −ρ − δ < 0, so the stability properties of those two points depend on
the roots of the characteristic polynomials of the submatrices:
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ρ+ δ + η − kj −qj +
a− c
N + 1
1
2r
[2(N + 1)qj − a+ c] ρ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
i.e.
pj(λ) = λ
2 − ρλ− 1
2r
µ
−qj +
a− c
N + 1
¶
[2(N + 1)qj − a+ c], j = 2, 3.
If j = 2, the two remaining eigenvalues are complex with real part ρ/2 > 0,
whereas if j = 3, they are real and at least one of them is positive, hence PB
and PC are saddle points too.
Although the equations (13-14) and (15-16) are not decoupled, we can
carry out a qualitative analysis of the phase curves of the system.
Given any solution curve (q(t), k(t)) of equations (15-16), we can eas-
ily obtain the state trajectories by applying separation of variable and La-
grange’s variation of constant methods to (13-14). Considering the vector of
initial conditions b (0) = b0, S(0) = S0, we have:
b (t) = b0eηt−
R t
0 k(s)ds,
S(t) =
µ
S0 + b0
Z t
0
³
e(η+δ)s−
R s
0 k(τ)dτ
´
q(s)ds
¶
e−δt.
As far as the saddle point equilibrium paths are concerned, we can state
the following:
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Proposition 3 In the half-space k > η, along each equilibrium trajectory of
the system close to PB and PC the state variables S and b are monotonically
decreasing to 0.
Proof. The stationary points PB and PC belong to the half-space k > η.
By calculating the eigenvectors of J(PB) and J(PC), it is straightforward to
see that the stable subspaces Es(PB) and Es(PC) are spanned by the vectors
of the canonical basis of R4: (1, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0, 0), that is the trajecto-
ries on the respective stable manifolds are heading towards the equilibrium
coordinates S = 0, b = 0.
The economic meaning of the previous results is clear: in correspondence
of the two points PB and PC the stock of pollution tends to diminish and
finally disappears.
Moreover, the optimal R&D eﬀort of the representative firm is positive
at any time t during the game. Or, put it the other way around, any non-
zero value of the co-state variable attached to the dynamics of the individual
firm’s contribution to the increase of the pollution stock ensures that the
firm itself has indeed an incentive to invest in R&D activities for pollution
abatement all along the game.
5 Profit and welfare assessment
We compare optimal quantities, profits and values of social welfare in the
three steady states. The following lemma results from a trivial chain of
inequalities:
Lemma 4 For every a, c, N , r, ρ, δ, η, we have qA > qC > qB.
The profit levels in the three cases are the following:
π(PA) =
(a− c)2
(N + 1)2
,
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π(PB) = (a− c)qB −Nq2B − r(ρ+ δ + η)2,
π(PC) = (a− c)qC −Nq2C − r(ρ+ δ + η)2.
To this regard, one can prove:
Proposition 5 Any ρ ∈ [0, δ + η) suﬃces to ensure that π(PA) > π(PC) >
π(PB).
The intuitition behind the above result is that PA is characterised by a
larger output level (which, per se, would be detrimental for profits) but the
corresponding R&D eﬀort is nil (which in turn is good news for profits), while
the remaining two steady states are characterised by lower output levels in
combination with positive R&D eﬀorts.
Now we turn to consumer surplus CS(Pi), i = A,B,C, in the three
equilibria. Note that, in principle, the definition of consumer surplus would
be CS(Pi) = Q2i /2−Si; however, Si = 0 always in steady state. The resulting
ranking is summarised in
Proposition 6 Over the entire admissible range of parameters, we have
CS(PA) > CS(PC) > CS(PB).
Finally, we evaluate social welfare SW (Pi) = Nπ(Pi) + CS(Pi), i =
A,B,C, to obtain:
Proposition 7 Over the entire admissible range of parameters, we have
SW (PA) > SW (PC) > SW (PB).
Lemma 4 and Propositions 5-7 also entail:
Corollary 8 Any ρ ∈ [0, δ + η) suﬃces to ensure that private and social
preferences over the spectrum of steady state equilibria are reciprocally aligned.
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This essentially relies upon the fact that the industry R&D eﬀort in PA
is nil. Of course, one has to keep in mind that the existence of a unanimous
ranking over steady states does not guarantee that the preferred one will
be attainable, as the trajectory followed by the dynamic system will indeed
depend on the vector of initial conditions on state variables.
6 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of the incentive for firms to carry out R&D
eﬀorts aimed at introducing environmental-friendly technologies. Contrary
to the acquired view establishing that such an incentive is lacking due to the
fact that firms fail to internalise the environmental externality, the dynamic
approach we have adopted in the foregoing analysis shows that firms do have
an R&D incentive in this direction throughout the game, although it may
indeed vanish in one specific steady state, which portrays the equilibrium
outcome of the corresponding static game.
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